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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/05/2006

Accident number: 310

Accident time: 08:45

Accident Date: 08/10/2000

Where it occurred: Rayat B MF, Choman
district

Country: Iraq

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 10/12/2000

ID original source: JJ/PR/ADJ

Name of source: UN/JJ/HT

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: Fuze

Ground condition: agricultural
(abandoned)
hard

Date record created: 19/02/2004

Date last modified: 19/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: MAG/E/0015 MF

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
inadequate equipment (?)
inadequate training (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
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Accident report
A UNOPS MAP Board of Inquiry was instigated and the following BOI report provided. For
unexplained “political” reasons, the original report was not provided by UNOPS. [The original
report was sourced elsewhere and is reproduced under Related papers.] UNOPS supplied a
censored report that is reproduced below, edited to allow it to be read smoothly. See also
Related papers.
The victim had been employed for approximately two years and six months. Because the
victim was a section leader, there was no record of any rest breaks he may have taken that
day. His last refresher training was an Excavation refresher training course three weeks
previously.
The task site was on flat ground surrounded by steeper ground/hills. It was “bounded by small
local dwellings” and was predominantly agricultural land. All manual clearance at the site
used a “full- excavation” method. The ground was very hard and required “constant wetting
down to facilitate clearance.”
On the day of the accident, work started at the site at 05:45. The victim was a Section Leader
who had been conducting his duties for three hours when, at 08:45 a deminer informed the
victim “that there was a strange object in his excavation lane”.
The Section Leader tried to excavate the object but had some difficulty “seeing it clearly
because his visor was dirty and scratched. So he raised his visor halfway to see better, than
grasped the object with the thumb and forefingers of his left hand and tried to pull and pry the
object from the earth with the trowel”. He was wearing his ROFI vest correctly. The object
detonated.
The BOI decided that the object had been a “detonator of some type” and that “due to the
blast signature on the protective equipment and the ground it was approx. 7 cm deep”.
The victim sustained injuries to both hands and his right eye. “Left hand amputated fingers
are (thumb, index and middle) fingers at the level of distal phalanges. Eye: Extensive wedge
shaped corneal wound, with hyphema”.
There was “minor blast damage to the inside of the visor. The board feels that since the visor
was subjected to blast damage, therefore weakening it, it should be taken out of operational
service”. There was also blast damage to the casualty’s vest, which the board felt was
repairable. The demining trowel also sustained minor blast damage but was considered to be
“still operationally deployable”.
“The BOI has deemed that all medical treatments (all stages) and medical evacuation
procedures provided by Manual Clearance Contractor personnel were adhered to and
performed in a proficient and timely manner. The casualty was transported directly to the
emergency first aid in Sub–District Hospital, where he was stabilized. He was then transferred
straight to the Main Emergency Hospital.”

Conclusion
The following is the conclusion of the BOI reproduced verbatim:
“It is the opinion of the Board of inquiry that there was no evidence whatsoever of any misuse
of drugs, alcohol or medication involved in or that contributed to the cause of the accident.
It is, however the opinion of the board that the accident was caused by the carelessness of
the section leader (casualty), due to the fact that he made a serious error in judgment by not
instructing the deminer to retreat 25 metres.
The board concludes that the scratches and cleanliness of the visor was partly attributable to
the reason that the casualty carried out his actions with his visor raised. “

Recommendations
The BOI made the following recommendations:
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“a) As a matter of IMMEDIATE priority all visors on all sites be inspected, and if scratched to
the point of reducing visibility they are to be replaced.
“b) All sites be issued cleaning equipment for visors e.g two tubs or buckets for water and
detergent, large enough to accommodate a visor each and also the immediate issue of some
sort of non scratching cleaning tissue.
“c) Manual Clearance Contractor conduct immediate remedial action/training, focusing on
adherence to correct safety distances/procedures while conducting investigations of
suspected mines/UXOs.”
Summarised Statements from the Team Leader, Site Commander, Witnesses and the victim
were not made available. See Related papers.

Victim Report
Victim number: 392

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
severe Eye
severe Hand
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Fingers
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
No formal medical report was made available. The BOI described the injuries as:
“Injury of both hands and right eye. Left hand amputated fingers are (thumb, index and
middle) fingers at the level of distal phalanges.
Eye: Extensive wedge shaped corneal wound, with hyphema.”

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the victim
was a Field Supervisor and he behaved irresponsibly by incautious excavation, wearing his
visor raised and failing to enforce safety distances. The selection and training of Field
Supervisors is a management responsibility. The secondary cause could be either
“inadequate equipment” because the condition of the visor was unserviceable or “inadequate
training” because the supervisor had apparently not been trained in UXO recognition.
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The provision of appropriate PPE in a serviceable condition is also a management
responsibility and the management’s failure in this case may have worsened the victim’s
injury considerably.
The BOI made several incorrect or misleading statements in their investigation. A few are
detailed below.
The BOI recommended that cleaning tissues, detergents and buckets for cleaning visors be
provided. Detergents should NOT be used to clean polycarbonate. Liquid soaps, warm water
and very soft material such as clean (washable and so re-useable) chamois leathers are
recommended.
The Board reported that there was “minor blast damage to the inside of the visor. The board
feels that since the visor was subjected to blast damage, therefore weakening it, it should be
taken out of operational service”. There was also blast damage to the casualty’s vest, which
the board felt was repairable.”
The members of the BOI should be advised that ALL PPE damaged in an explosive accident
should be destroyed, not repaired.
The BOI decided that the explosive object had been a “detonator of some type, due to the
blast signature on the protective equipment and the ground it was approx. 7 cm deep”.
The BOI should be advised that any crater analysis made without a soil-hardness tester is
simply guessing – and that a detonator needs a means of initiation: the object was probably a
fuze included a detonator.
The failure of the BOI to investigate the circumstances thoroughly and suggest practical
solutions is a serious “Management Control Inadequacy” meaning that an opportunity to
correct dangerous practices was lost. The failure of the country MAC to make available the
full BOI may imply that they were aware that their work could be criticised.

Related papers
Access to the following BOI report was denied by the UNOPS MAC for “political reasons”. It
was obtained from another source and is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. A Memo
agreeing to the main points and querying the delay in releasing the report is appended.

UNOPS BOARD OF INQUIRY ON A UXO/MINE ACCIDENT IN RAYAT "B" MINEFIELD IN
CHOMAN
Introduction
1. On 8 October 2000, a UXO accident occurred in the Rayat B minefield (E/0015) in
Choman. The accident happened at approximately 0845 hours.
2. On 9 October 2000 a Board of Inquiry (BOI) was appointed to investigate the accident,
with [two UNOPS personnel] and a [Demining group representative] instituted as the
members of the Board.
Process of Investigation
3. The BOI formally convened on 10 October 2000 and collected written statements and
conducted separate interviews with personnel who were involved in the accident.
Initial Investigation
4. The initial investigation was conducted by [the Demining group] Location Manager on 8
Oct 2000. All personnel involved in events leading up to and including the accident were
made available for interviews. The initial accident report is at Annex A. [Not made available.]
5. The victim, Section Leader, was seen by the BOI team at the Erbil Emergency Hospital on
10 October. [The Victim] was in some discomfort, on advice from medical staff questioning
was delayed to enable time for [him] to gain more strength. Photos were taken and a
interview date was set for 15 October. [The Victim] was interviewed by the BOI team at the
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Erbil Emergency Hospital on 15 October. Although in some degree of pain [the Victim]
appeared to be alert and coherent and had little difficulty relating the events leading up to and
including the accident (See interview at Annex B). [Not made available.]
Geography
6. The accident occurred in the Rayat B minefield, in the Choman district. The site is
approximately 90 km East of Soran Base. The task site is on flat ground surrounded by
steeper ground I hills. It is bounded by small local dwellings and is predominantly agricultural
land.
7. All manual clearance on this site is full excavation, the ground on site is very hard and
requires constant wetting down to facilitate clearance. The location of the accident is
approximately 150 metres from the task site control point.
Tasking
8. The Mine Clearance Team was conducting manual demining operations.
Supervision
9. The task was supervised by the Team Leader. It should be noted here that the demining
pair, Deminer No 1 and No 2, were operating in "two-man drills" as they have only recently
graduated from the last demining course (Sep - Oct 00). Further supervision was conducted
by [a demining group person]. [The demining pair] were spoken to by the BOI team but not
formally interviewed, as it was the opinion of the Board that due their positions on site i.e.
where they were standing at the time, they were not able to provide sufficient insight as to the
Section Leader’s actions.
Communications
10. Communication was two way between the task site and UNOPS in Soran Fort. At the
time of the accident all means of communication were functioning effectively.
The UXO
11. It is unclear as to the type of UXO involved in this accident. It is the opinion of the BOI
that it was a detonator of some type due to the blast signature on the protective equipment
and the ground, and also injuries suffered by [the Victim]. It is also the opinion of the board
that further investigation with current resources will not accurately identify the UXO.
Leave/Stand-down
12. The last official leave period for the deminers was 22-24 Sep 00 PC's long weekend,
however the deminers still had the normal weekend breaks prior to the accident.
Work Timings
13. Work commenced that day at 0545 and concluded for 24 hours after the accident, as per
[Demining group] SOP 1, para 1.3.7.
Monitoring
14. In accordance with the site log, the team was monitored on 5 October 2000 by their
Group Supervisor. The last complete on-site visit by the [the demining group’s internal]
monitoring team was conducted over the period 3-5 Sep 00.
Kit and Equipment
15. All deminers at the time were wearing protective equipment i.e. vest and visor.
16. Medical equipment was available with the medic, approximately 80 metres from the site
and an ambulance was stationed approximately 100 metres from the accident site, in the
admin area.
Damage to Equipment
17. There was minor (blast) damage to the victims' vest which is repairable. There was also
minor blast damage to the inside of the visor. The board feels that since the visor was
subjected to blast damage, therefore weakening it, it should be taken out of operational
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service. The demining trowel suffered minor blast damage, however it is still operationally
deployable.
18. The "splash'1 marks caused by the blast to the visor, however, are confined to the inside
of the visor. This indicates that the visor was in the upright position at the time of the accident,
as confirmed by the victim (Annex B).
Medical Treatment/Medevac
19. The BOI has deemed that all medical treatment (at all stages) and medical evacuation
procedures provided by [the Demining group] personnel were adhered to and performed in a
proficient and timely manner, with little or no problems. It should be noted that [the group]
carries out regular casualty evacuation exercises, and had conducted their last one on 5
October.
20. The patient was transported directly to the emergency first aid post in Soran, where he
was stabilised. He was then transferred straight to the Emergency Hospital in Erbil. See
medical report from [Demining group] Health and Safety Supervisor attached at Annex D. [Not
made available.]
Revision/Refresher Training
21. All teams in [the group] conducted the appropriate revision I refresher training within 24
hours of the accident occurring (see Annex E para 6 "Actions Taken"). The training that was
conducted covered the following subjects;
a.
b.
C.
d.

Confirmation of emergency procedures;
Correct use of personal protection equipment;
Safety distances; and
Handover procedures

Account of Accident
22. This account is assembled from statements and interviews taken from witnesses.
23. At approximately 0745 the Deminer No 1 changed over with [his No.2] and started
working. At approximately 0815 [the deminer] partially uncovered what he thought was a
strange object, and so called the Section Leader, [the Victim] for assistance.
24. Upon viewing the object, [the Victim] directed [Deminer No.2] to remain where he was, 25
metres away, but told [Deminer No.1] to go back 10-12 metres and wait.
25. [The Victim] then knelt down at the excavation and proceeded to carry out his own
investigation (probably to satisfy his own curiosity before notifying the Team Leader, but this
cannot be ascertained). Upon examination of the site, [The Victim] saw a small object, which
he thought to be some sort of capsule, but because of the scratching on his visor could not be
sure.
26. He attempted to excavate the object but had some difficulty whereby he raised his visor
halfway to see better, then grasped the object with the thumb and forefingers of his left hand
and tried to pull the object to loosen it from the earth. It was at this time that the device
functioned. The "stop stand still" order was given and medics dispatched to the aid of the
victim. Immediately after the detonation, [The Victim] stood up and moved to the perimeter
(approximately five metres away) where the medical personnel found and treated him.

CONCLUSIONS
Cause of the Accident
27. It is the opinion of the Board of Inquiry that there was no evidence whatsoever of any
misuse of drugs, alcohol or medication involved in or that contributed to the cause of the
accident.
28. It is, however the opinion of the Board that the accident was caused by the carelessness
of the Section Leader [the Victim], due to his actions described above, and in his statement
(Annex B). Also, the Board considers that [the Victim] made a serious error in judgment by not
instructing the No 1 to retreat 25 metres.
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29. The Board concludes that the state of visors are partly attributable to the reason that [the
Victim] carried out his actions with his visor up. [The Victim]'s visor was dirty, poorly cleaned
and scratched which would have made it extremely difficult for him to identify what is believed
to have been a small object.
30. Furthermore, all visors issued to the Board by the Team Leader of [the group] were of
similar condition to the one worn by [the Victim]. Poor visibility through the visors is common,
to the extent that members of the Board, while conducting a close examination of the site
experienced extreme difficulty identifying small objects in the soil. It should be noted that a
close examination of the site was conducted by the Board at approximately the same time as
the accident, two days after and in the same weather conditions, to better ascertain actual
conditions during the accident.

RECOMMENDATIONS
31.

The Board of Inquiry recommends the following:

a. As a matter of IMMEDIATE priority all visors on all sites be inspected, and if scratched to
the point of reducing visibility they are to be replaced,
b. All sites be issued cleaning equipment for visors e.g. two tubs or buckets for water and
detergent, large enough to accommodate a visor each and also the immediate issue of some
sort of non scratching cleaning tissue, and
c. [the demining group] conduct immediate remedial action/training, focusing on adherence to
correct safety distances/procedures while conducting investigations of suspected mines
and/or UXOs.
Dated 16 October 2000 [See following paper for actual release date.]

Memo
To: UNOPS Project Co-ordinator
Date: 10 Dec 00
Bol Requirements
1. The requirements listed in your UNOPSIOP/4071324100 dated 3 Dec are noted and the
recommendations are agreed. It is also noted the Bol finished the report on 16 October and it
is only just released to [Demining group] on 10 Dec almost two months after the event. This
delay makes it difficult to ensure that all [demining group] staff will be advised of the
requirements prior to the close of operations and that SOP amendments can be staffed.
However, the relevant instructions will be issued to ensure the remedial steps are in place
prior to the start of operations in the New Year. SOP amendments will be produced in the
New Year.
2. The remedial steps that have already been taken already to mitigate a repeat of the
accident are:
a. Daily inspections of all Deminer’s personal protective equipment is made by the Team
Leader prior to the start of operations each day to ensure the serviceability of such kit,
b. Methods to return the clarity of vision to scratched visors have been investigated - such as
"buffing" of the visor with a jeweller’s grinder to remove scratches, use of a paste to clean
scratches.
c. Issue of protective covers and carry bags for the visors for use when the visors are being
transported.
d. Training of Team Leaders in recognition of basic UXO components.
e. Revision of Basic Deminers Course syllabus to include recognition of basic UXO
components which will be incorporated in future courses.
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f. Imposition of disciplinary proceedings against personnel who fail to wear the visor correctly
when inside the demarcated areas of a minefield and also against that person's immediate
supervisor,
g. Closure of the operations site if non [demining group] personnel fail to comply with the
requirement to wear a visor correctly inside the demarcated areas of the minefield and
reporting of that situation via the Monthly Report.
3. The concerns about the repeat nature of this accident are shared. [The Demining group]
has already conducted an analysis of all mine accidents to attempt to identify any trends. The
results of this analysis have been forwarded to UNOPS separately.
4. It is requested that further Bol reports be issued to [the Demining group] as soon as
possible after the completion of the Investigation to allow the necessary remedial action to be
carried out.
5. Thank you
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